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Abstract
The international community spends significant sums of money on democracy pro-
motion and support, focusing especially on producing competitive and transparent
electoral environments in the developing world. In theory, this aid empowers a variety
of actors, increasing competition and government responsiveness. Most efforts to de-
termine the effect of democracy aid, however, have focused on how aggregate measures
of democracy, and broad concepts, such as electoral competition or media freedom,
respond to aid efforts. We argue that to fully understand the effect of aid on democ-
ratization one must consider how democracy aid affects specific country institutions.
Building on theory from the democratization and democracy promotion literature, we
specify more precise causal linkages between democracy assistance and electoral quality.
Specifically, we hypothesize about the effects of democracy aid on the implementation
and quality of elections. We test these hypotheses using V-Dem’s detailed elections
measures, using Finkel, Perez-Linan & Seligson’s (2007) data and modeling strategy, to
examine the impact of democracy aid. Intriguingly, we find that there is no consistent
relationship between democracy and governance aid and the improvement of specific
micro-level indicators of democratic institutions or election quality, but that aggregate
measures still capture a relationship between aid and democracy. We then investigate
the possibility that empirical relationships between aid and democracy may not reflect
aid-induced democratization, but may instead reflect investments countries make in
regimes they observe democratizing.
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1 Introduction
In the post-Cold War era, democracy promotion has become a key foreign policy objective of
developed democracies (Burnell 2005, Carothers 1999, Collins 2009, Ikenberry 2000, Youngs
2002). Yet, the question of whether meaningful democratic change can be promoted through
external stimuli remains a matter of scholarly and public debate. Democracy promotion
may take a variety of forms, including economic sanctions and rewards—often in the form
of preferential trade agreements or economic aid—diplomatic pressure, and even military
action. Here, we focus on the effectiveness of foreign aid as a tool to promote democracy.
A growing literature has found that foreign aid is associated with higher levels of democ-
racy under some conditions (Goldsmith 2001, Bermeo 2011, Dunning 2004, Finkel, Perez-
Linan & Seligson 2007, Scott & Steele 2011). While the literature has focused on democracy,
writ large, when examining the relationship between democracy promotion and regime qual-
ity, we attempt to examine the micro-foundations of this relationship. Specifically, following
Finkel, Perez-Linan & Seligson’s (2007) influential paper, we ask whether democracy pro-
motion works through the empowerment of agents and the building of nut-and-bolts insti-
tutions that support democratic process. Specifically, we examine the relationship between
democracy aid and the quality of electoral institutions like voting registries and electoral
management boards, and between aid and aspects of the electoral process such as suffrage,
vote buying and irregularities, voter intimidation, and electoral violence.
While we successfully use new measures to replicate earlier findings that show a positive
relationship between democracy aid and aggregate levels of democratic quality, replicating
existing results, we find surprisingly little evidence that democracy promotion works by build-
ing the institutional capacity necessary for conducting clean and safe elections. Our models
cannot establish a robust association between USAID spending on democracy and gover-
nance aid and even basic technical capacities such as improved or more autonomous election
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management. The mechanisms through which technical foreign aid promotes democracy
remain, therefore, troublingly elusive. We speculate that our inability to find a relationship
between governance aid and democracy except at the broadest aggregate level (e.g. Polity
scores, high aggregate V-Dem indices) may reflect endogenous processes in aid distribu-
tion. Specifically, aid-providing countries may identify already democratizing targets and
distribute funds to bolster democratization, but may not induce democratization themselves
with their programs. We perform preliminary analysis using synthetic control methods that
suggests that, indeed, aid may follow broad changes in aggregate democracy rather than
building democratic countries from the ground up.
2 Foreign Aid and Democratic Change
Evidence that aid can have a meaningful impact on democratization is inconsistent. Notably,
while many scholars provide evidence that aid promotes democracy (Carnegie & Marinov
2017), a variety of studies have found that aid has relatively little effect (Knack 2004),
or even a detrimental impact (Brautigam & Knack 2004, Djankov, Montalvo & Raynal-
Querol 2008, Knack 2001, Licht 2010) on democratic change and institutional development.
Variation across these findings reflect the diversity of approaches researchers use to iden-
tify causal mechanisms by which aid might promote democratic change. Theories of democ-
racy promotion attempt to meld foreign policy and democratization theories in the hope
of providing a convincing causal story of how external stimuli influence internal political
processes. In doing so, scholars have studied a variety of potential relationships.
Democratization theories generally focus on power relations between the incumbent gov-
ernment and other societal actors such as dissidents or opposition groups, minorities, winning
coalitions, civil society groups, and the military (Acemoglu & Robinson 2006, Moore 1966,
Ansell & Samuels 2014). Theories of democracy promotion suggest that aid might be used
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to directly and indirectly affect these groups’ relative power.
Indirectly, foreign aid could be used to promote economic development. A consider-
able volume of literature links democratization to economic development, suggesting that
as populations become wealthier repression becomes more costly (Moore 1966, Acemoglu &
Robinson 2006, Przeworksi, Alvarez, Cheibub & Limongi 2000). Likewise, as the wealth of a
population grows, it traditionally becomes a source of revenue for governments through tax-
ation unless provided by other, independent, means (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson &
Morrow 2003, Stasavage 2003, Robinson 2006, Haber & Menaldo 2011). When governments
are dependent upon tax revenue, citizens can demand greater political liberalization. Thus,
if foreign aid were to effectively improve economic development, it would be expected to have
the indirect effect of promoting democracy. Indeed, several studies suggest that economic
aid is correlated with greater democratization. Goldsmith (2001), for example, found that
aid is associated with higher levels of democracy. Bermeo (2011) and Dunning (2004) find
that, while aggregate aid is not associated with democratic change, aid from democratic
donors has a positive impact on regime change and democratic improvements, especially in
the post-Cold War era.
These theories assume a causal relationship between taxation and the devolution of power
from the regime to citizens. In turn, these arguments suggest that, if a government has
an independent source of income and is not dependent upon taxation, there should be no
real pressure to make democratic change. In these cases, which echo the resource curse,
the financial independence of the government created by foreign aid may help stabilize and
entrench authoritarian governments (Djankov, Montalvo & Raynal-Querol 2008, Licht 2010).
However, other studies have found that the “free money” effect is conditioned by domestic
political factors (Altincekic & Bearce 2014, Bader & Faust 2014, Kono & Montinola 2009)
and how aid is delivered. Aid delivered through NGO’s or third party partners is likely to
have a substantially different impact than direct budgetary assistance (Wright & Winters
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2010, Dietrich 2013, Dietrich & Wright 2015).
In addition to these indirect linkages, foreign aid might instead be used directly to sup-
port democratization by empowering societal actors. Although many studies examining
economic aid and democratization discuss agent empowerment as the primary causal mech-
anism, most rely on the previously discussed indirect linkages. By contrast, democracy
assistance is aid that is designed and allocated specifically to empower specific societal ac-
tors and build institutional knowledge and capacity for the purposes of creating democratic
change. Governments around the world hope to build democratic institutions and agents
from the ground up using foreign aid.
While traditional development aid may further democracy indirectly in the long term, it
also may be used to serve a variety of foreign policy objectives. Thus, it is generally difficult
to track its use and evaluate its impact on democracy, either positive or negative. Democracy
assistance, on the other hand, is only intended to support democratization, and thus may be
more easily tracked. In addition, the causal mechanisms between democracy assistance and
democratic change are more direct than, say, foreign policy objectives. Finkel, Perez-Linan
& Seligson (2007) explains: “Targeted democracy assistance, by contrast, works to educate
and empower voters, support political parties, labor unions, and womens advocacy networks,
strengthen human rights groups, and otherwise build ‘constituencies for reform’; it thus
attempts to influence democratic outcomes in both the short term and the medium term.” By
empowering domestic actors, institutions, and organizations, democracy assistance attempts
to directly alter the power relationship between an incumbent government and key domestic
actors, prompting liberalization and democratic opening.
While Finkel, Perez-Linan & Seligson (2007) argue that democracy aid works through
“agent empowerment,” Scott & Steele (2011) suggest “anticipated reactions” may also di-
rectly influence democratic change. Their argument suggests that democracy assistance en-
courages recipient governments to implement democracy changes in order to secure further
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funding from democratic donors.
Although both Finkel, Perez-Linan & Seligson (2007) and Scott & Steele (2011) find
evidence that democracy assistance does promote democracy, a variety of studies suggest
that relationship between democracy assistance and democratic change is more complex
than the “agent empowerment” and “anticipated reactions” mechanisms suggest. Wright
(2009) points out that democracy assistance may be conditioned by recipient participation.
Where democracy assistance may seek to fund the administration and holding of free and
fair elections, elections may be riskier for some autocrats than others. Wright (2009) argues
that in autocracies where elections are riskier, democracy assistance aid will likely be used
by the government in a manner in which it will have the least impact: avoiding elections.
Thus, according to Wright (2009), democracy assistance should only bolster democratization
in instances where the risk of an incumbent losing office is low.
In addition to considering when recipients will accept democracy assistance or not, Bush
(2015) argues that the nature of democracy assistance has changed dramatically, making it
both more acceptable to authoritarian recipients and less effective. Specifically, Bush (2015)
argues that since the end of the Cold War, and especially since the turn of the century, US
democracy assistance targeting opposition or dissidents directly has declined dramatically;
aid to dissidents has decreased in real dollars and as a proportion of democracy assistance.
Instead, aid for what is known as “good governance” has made up an ever increasing pro-
portion of democracy assistance aid. Aid for good governance includes technical support
for elections and electoral institutions, support for legislative bodies and training of legisla-
tive staff, and promotion of women’s groups. Aid designed to improve governance is less
confrontational towards dictators, and focuses on clearly measurable outcomes. This funda-
mental change in the nature of democracy assistance means that donors are now, more than
ever, most focused on attempting to identify the more micro-level causal relationships that
promote higher order democratic change.
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Technical assistance, “the provision of donor funded personnel to supply missing skills
and train local people” (Arndt, 2000, p. 159) is regarded by various aid organizations as a
key instrument that enhances governance. Three types of technical assistance predominate.
First, aid agencies work to fill knowledge gaps through consultants and advisors. Second,
they help with the creation and strengthening of institutions, often by improving bureau-
cratic function, working to standardize procedures within institutions. Third, agencies train
recipient country officials, usually to support oversight or capacity building activities (Arndt,
2000). Technical assistance is believed to create a monitoring effect, giving donors greater
oversight when they cannot trust funding and implementation to recipient government agen-
cies (Arndt 2000, Berg 2000, Maipose 2000).
Whether the “taming” of aid produced more or less effective democracy assistance is up
for debate. Bush suggests that the taming of democracy assistance has made it less effective
in promoting democracy while Gibson, Hoffman & Jablonski (2015) offer evidence that tech-
nical aid can be effective. Specifically, Gibson et al argue that, in post-Cold War sub-Saharan
Africa, technical assistance increased political concessions by incumbent governments and
decreased resources available for patronage. The inconclusive findings within the democracy
assistance literature suggest a variety of problems when trying to evaluate the impact of
democracy assistance aid. First, while there has been some effort to identify causal linkages
between aid and the process of democratization, further theoretical development is needed to
better incorporate domestic factors, such as including incorporation of strategic calculations
by recipient governments. Finkel, Perez-Linan & Seligson (2007) provided one of the most
detailed theoretical explanations for how democracy assistance might affect democratiza-
tion. However, in the nearly ten years since its publication, limited effort has been made to
flesh out the dynamics among donors, recipient governments, and key domestic democratic
agents.
Technical theories generally focus on the mobilization and empowerment of a variety of
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domestic actors and agents, including opposition forces, civil society, voters, minorities and
under-represented groups, and the media. However, most quantitative studies rely on higher
level measures of democracy to evaluate the impact of aid. Only a small portion of the
literature attempts to tie democracy assistance to mid-level changes as Finkel, Perez-Linan
& Seligson (2007) do. Fewer still attempt to tie democracy assistance to micro-level changes
or trace micro-level changes to higher order measures of democratic change. Using new data,
our study attempts to fill this gap.
Agent empowerment, as described by Finkel, Perez-Linan & Seligson (2007), forms the
foundation of our theory. We start by considering whether democracy assistance promotes
democracy by empowering key domestic agents, thereby altering the calculations of the
incumbent government. We add empirical depth to a well established argument by incorpo-
rating micro-level explanations. As Wright (2009) suggests, recipient governments are active
participants in the aid process and may accept or reject democracy assistance. It is un-
likely that incumbent governments accept democracy assistance packages that will seriously
undermine their political power.
This does not mean that an incumbent authoritarian will reject all democracy assistance,
only aid that may pose a threat to their power. Democracy assistance in its current form
is rarely of a kind that directly confronts autocrats through the funding of dissidents. As
a result, the vast majority of democracy assistance is technical assistance directed at small
measurable outcomes. These small measurable objectives are less threatening to autocratic
incumbents than opposition cultivation, yet technical assistance that supports voter regis-
tration, enables the formation of additional parties, strengthens the electoral management
board, and increases the cost of electoral fraud may all increase the likelihood of political
reform (Faye & Niehaus 2012, Hyde & Marinov 2014, Resnick & van de Walle 2013). If
it does so, it provides an acceptable way for foreign governments to enhance democracy,
regardless of regime preferences.
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Agent empowerment may take any of several forms. The US Agency for International
Development (USAID)—the agency responsible for a directing and managing US democracy
assistance—identifies two democracy specific development objectives within their “Democ-
racy, Human Rights, and Governance” strategy framework. The first objective is to “promote
participatory, representative and inclusive political processes and government institutions”
(US Agency for International Development 2013). This includes activities that support the
implementation of participatory political processes by state institutions, including advising,
training, and financial support for electoral management boards.
The second objective is to “foster greater accountability of institutions and leaders to
citizens and to the law” (US Agency for International Development 2013) This objective
focuses on activities that support citizen participation, such as voter registration. In ad-
dition, it encourages the development of institutions and systems that promote political
competition—including the creation and inclusion of political parties—and seeks to assist
governments and state institutions by building public trust in government through institu-
tional reform. We use these strategic objectives and their corresponding activities to propose
a series of micro-level outcomes that we can examine to test the impact of democracy assis-
tance.
If “agent empowerment” is the primary mechanism through which democracy assistance
promotes democratic change in recipient countries, one should expect to observe micro-level
changes in democratic agents’ power in addition to previously observed macro-level shifts
in aggregate level of democracy. Specifically, one would expect democracy assistance to be
correlated with improvements in voter registration, stronger and more autonomous electoral
management boards, growth in legal political parties, and less electoral fraud. On the other
hand, if democracy aid works primarily through “anticipated reactions,” we might expect
to see macro-level shifts in democracy in the absence of such micro-foundations. Similarly,
if the relationship between democracy aid and aggregate democratic quality is endogenous
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and aid agencies reward states for improvements in democratic function rather than build
democracy, we might also see a positive aggregate relationship between aid without also
observing a relationship between aid and the effectiveness of the agents and institutions that
democracy aid is thought to support.
3 Data and Methods
We use Finkel, Perez-Linan & Seligson’s (2007) modeling strategy as a starting point for our
analysis. Building on their dataset, which contains detailed cross-national information on
US democracy assistance and recipient country characteristics for the period between 1990
and 2003, we examine the relationship between democracy aid and changes in the quality of
the set of micro-level outcomes that we described in the previous section. We specify models
that replicate Finkel, Perez-Linan & Seligson’s (2007) specifications using new dependent
variables. In particular, we fit hierarchical growth models that are meant to capture and
predict differences in the timing and trajectories of recipient country regime characteristics.
These models use random intercepts for recipient country with an accompanying year random
slope, along with a linear year term. They also adjust errors for heteroscedasticity and a
time dependent AR1 error structure. The models contain a set of dynamic, time-varying
variables (including the critical measures of U.S. aid behavior), in addition to a series of static
country characteristic variables which are allowed to interact with the linear time trend.
Instead of predicting traditional democracy variables like Freedom House or Polity, however,
we instead begin by examining how both election assistance and aggegate governance aid
predict measures of a variety of agent capacities and electoral characteristics. We finish by
predicting dependent variables which closely resemble aggregate measures like Policy and
Freedom House, replicating Finkel, Perez-Linan & Seligson’s (2007) results.
In order to test the effects of U.S. democracy and governance aid on the empowerment
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of micro-level electoral agents/characteristics, we use newly released data from the Varieties
of Democracy (V-Dem) project (Coppedge, Gerring, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman,
Bernhard, Fish, Glynn, Hicken, Knutsen, Marquardt, McMann, Miri, Paxton, Pemstein,
Staton, Tzelgov, Wang & Zimmerman 2018). V-Dem data represent expert rated obser-
vations at the country level for virtually all countries, with an extensive timespan. V-Dem
uses the assessment of many country expert raters for each observation, scaled together using
a Bayesian measurement model (Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang & Miri 2015, Mar-
quardt & Pemstein In Press), to provide assessments of hundreds of individual country,
regime, and election characteristics. Of particular interest for this project, V-Dem coded a
number of variables that measure plausible electoral agents/policies that could be directly
affected using foreign aid to improve electoral democracy (e.g. election management boards).
V-Dem simultaneously incorporates indices measuring high-level, aggregated, characteristics
like strength of party competition or free and fair elections indices, allowing us to compare
the effect of aid on specific characteristics of electoral democracy along with the effect on
high-level assessments of democracy level. In short, the granularity of the data allow us
to find out which agents are being empowered and if that empowerment is associated with
aggregate level changes in electoral quality and better competitive, multiparty, democracy.1
First, we use V-Dem’s measurements of several specific electoral institutions that should
be directly tied to technical democracy assistance aid as the dependent variable. We use
V-Dem variables measuring the accuracy of voting registries in the country (ordinal by as-
sessment of accuracy), de facto suffrage (%), election management board (EMB) autonomy
(ordinal by level of autonomy), and electoral management board capacity (ordinal by capac-
ity).2 These are the types of observable, nuts and bolts, improvements to democracy that
1Note that all variables at the election level, which include many of the micro-level data on elections, are
only measured for each election. We repeat observations of the last election for any characteristic measured
only at election year and repeat it until the next election. We are currently debating alternate ways to
handle this issue in future versions of the paper.
2Variables 3.1.12, 3.1.74, 3.1.6, 3.1.7, respectively.
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could be directly empowered by technical foreign aid for democracy. They are logical targets
for modern, measurable, foreign aid improvements in democracy that empower agents.
We move next to modeling changes in micro-level characteristics of elections themselves.
We model changes in the quality of elections using specific characteristics of a country’s last
election measured by V-Dem: extent of vote buying behavior, incidence of voting irregulari-
ties, amount of government intimidation, and level of overall electoral violence, all measured
using ordinal assessments.3 Here, we can see if foreign aid affects the propensity of specific
maladies that often plague elections in new and developing democracies.
Finally, we model changes in V-Dem’s aggregate indices of the quality of democracy in
countries. Specifically, we predict how multiparty and competitive a country’s last election
was, how free and fair, overall, its elections are, and its aggregate quality of electoral democ-
racy using both an institutional and liberal concept of democracy.4 The final two variables
are of interest because they correspond most closely with the literature at large’s aggregate
democracy dependent variables represented by Polity or Freedom House. Changes in these
variables are simultaneously the most important but also the most causally distant from
actual democracy improvement projects because it can be conceptually difficult to associate
specific objectives or projects with broad-based changes in the overall level of democracy
within a country.
4 Results
Table 1 shows a consistent, surprising trend: democracy and governance aid is not associated
with improvements in the specific electoral institutions we might expect to benefit from
3Variables 3.1.21, 3.1.24, 3.1.27, 3.1.30, respectively
4Variables 3.21, 2.2.6, 2.1.1, 2.1.2 represent indices scaled together from a number of other extant V-Dem
variables to measure a bigger picture concept.
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democracy and governance aid projects.5 By contrast, democracy measured in its broadest
sense does appear to covary with aid disbursements. In fact, the more micro and technical
we delve with respect to the dependent variable, the more ambiguous the results. The money
toward specific projects that aids the conduct of electoral democracy may be associated with
changes in, for example, a broad liberal conception of democracy, but shows no statistically
significant effect in predicting improvements in those institutions that directly conduct of
elections.6
To begin, Models 1-3 trace the most micro-level possible connection between aid and
democracy. Specifically, these models include an independent variable from Finkel, Perez-
Linan & Seligson (2007) that granularly tracks money disbursed by USAID for projects to
assist in the conduct of elections and its covariance with three micro measures of electoral
quality: quality of voter registry, and autonomy and capacity of electoral management boards
(EMB). These measures are relatively non-political and represent the sort of aid that could
be considered purely technical at the project level. The results are inconclusive; electoral
project aid is almost completely unrelated to quality of voter registry changes while it is at
best only mildly correlated with election management board improvements.
Because it is possible that all kinds of democracy and governance aid, not just election
aid, could bolster core electoral functions and institutions, Models 4-7 expand on the previous
modelling approach by using a less granular independent variable, all USAID democracy and
governance aid. The results of these models suggest that the quality of election registry, the
openness of suffrage, and the autonomy and capacity of the electoral management board
were not improved by any type of USAID democracy and governance spending. In fact,
the measures tracking these agents show few statistically significant improvements from any
5For brevity, we simply present the coefficient and standard errors for the democracy and governance aid
variables of interest in these tables. See appendix for full results from all models.
6Note that all ordinal V-Dem variables (all dependent variables in the paper save suffrage restriction in
Model 2) are coded such that positive changes correspond to normatively desirable changes; thus a positive
sign for Registry indicates a predicted improvement in the quality and accuracy of the country’s voter registry
and a positive sign for vote buying indicates a country predicted to have less vote buying activity.
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Table 1: Predicting Electoral Quality Characteristics with U.S. Elections Aid
Dependent Variable US Elect Aid US Election Aid Std Error US DG Aid US DG Aid Std Error
Voter Registry (Model 1) -0.0019 (0.0083)
EMB Autonomy (Model 2) 0.0241 (0.0169)
EMB Capacity (Model 3) 0.0213 (0.0130)
Voter Registry (Model 4) 0.0023 (0.0028)
Suffrage (Model 5) 0.1340 (0.0955)
EMB Autonomy (Model 6) 0.0034 (0.0051)
EMB Capacity (Model 7) 0.0031 (0.0027)
Vote Buying (Model 8) -0.0033 (0.0021)
Vote Irregularities (Model 9) -0.0006 (0.0037)
Gov Intimidation (Model 10) 0.0114** (0.0044)
Election Violence (Model 11) 0.0001 (0.0047)
Multiparty (Model 12) 0.0131** (0.0043)
Free & Fair (Model 13) 0.0025* (0.0013)
Polyarchy Index (Model 14) 0.0017* (0.0007)
Lib Dem Index (Model 15) 0.0016** (0.0006)
Coefficients and standard errors for democracy and governance aid extracted from full specification tables presented
in the appendix. Models 1-3 use a granular independent variable of democracy and governance aid used for election
projects, while Models 4-15 use democracy and governance aid overall as the key explanatory variable.
** p-value less than .05
* p-value less than .10
type of foreign aid, technical or non-technical.7
Moving to our second type of dependent variables, measuring potential impediments to
fully democratic elections, we predict how widespread vote buying, voting irregularities, gov-
ernment intimidation during elections, and electoral violence are using U.S. foreign aid flows
and USAID democracy and governance aid in particular. One explanation for our previous
results is that while democracy and governance aid may not bolster the agents running the
specific institutions we have solid measurements for, perhaps other, unmeasured, agents are
being empowered to improve democracy that are not systematically measured. If that is so,
we might expect that democracy and governance aid tracks closely with the containment of
types of non-democratic behavior associated with tainted elections but does not move as-
sessments of electoral capacity. This might allow us to pinpoint which maladies are managed
7See full model results in the appendix for tables showing non-democracy and governance and a myriad
of other variables.
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effectively by democracy and governance aid. Models 8-11 on table 1 yield only one clear
result (government intimidation), and it is not wholly supportive of the empowering agents
approach suggested by the literature that justifies technical aid strategies. USAID democracy
and governance aid is not statistically associated with any type of electoral improvements
save for a reduction in government intimidation around elections. But if USAID democracy
and governance aid is improving democracy by empowering agents to prevent cheating, dis-
order, and misconduct, it is confusing that the only behavior changed by aid is the incumbent
government’s willingness to alter election results through repression, intimidation, violence,
or harassment. Indeed, this explanation may be more consistent with a story of potential
sanction by international actors than empowerment of agents and institutions—incumbent
governments receiving governance aid may be afraid of cracking down too hard during elec-
tions to ensure desirable results due to reputation effects with donors (Scott & Steele 2011).
Regardless of the salience of sanction, it is fair to say that there is little evidence from these
models that democracy and governance aid significantly alters the incidence of specific types
of misconduct in elections and at the polls as its proponents expect.
On the other hand, when we return to the aggregate picture with our models, our re-
sults bear out Finkel, Perez-Linan & Seligson (2007) and others’ findings on the impact of
governance aid on the quality of democracy and democracy level. Models 12-15 show a rea-
sonably robust and statistically significant positive relationship between governance aid on
the overall levels of democracy within countries. Elections are more competitive and multi-
party, elections are freer and fairer. Moreover, democracy measured on the aggregate using
institutional and liberal measures of democracy provided by V-Dem are positively associated
with democracy and governance aid. Countries that receive technical USAID democracy and
governance aid are more democratic, as found previously with Polity in the original paper
and again here with V-Dem indicators. Moreover, the more aggregate the dependent variable
becomes and the more we pull away from the institutional measures of democracy—see the
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V-Dem liberal democracy measure, which emphasizes less tangible human rights and other
considerations—the stronger the relationship between aid and democracy becomes.
4.1 Expaining Micro/Macro Patterns
In sum, although democracy aid appears to be correlated with increases in higher level
measures of democracy, it does not appear to be correlated with improvements in agent
empowerment and institutional governance, the theorized mechanisms through which gov-
ernance aid is supposed to improve democracy for the empowering agents story. In order
to better understand this discrepancy, we examined the data to determine which cases were
driving the results. We specifically examined cases where substantively significant increases
in democracy aid preceded significant increases in democracy measures. Within our sample,
only 45 cases experienced a greater than one standard deviation increase in democracy aid
one year and a greater than one standard deviation increase in democracy the following year.
These cases, in which aid might reasonably be argued to have influenced democracy in the
broadest sense, are a collection of relatively unique instances in which other mechanisms may
be at play. For example, 10 of the cases represent improvements to democracy in eastern
European states following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Likewise, several cases are
the result of separation of an existing state or creation of a new state, such as the dissolution
of Czechoslovakia and creation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, or the independence of
Eritrea, both in 1993. In addition, several cases reflect other unique and tumultuous circum-
stances. For example, South Africa’s 1994 transition from apartheid and the end of Sierra
Leone’s civil war in 2003 are both influential cases in our sample. Similarly, the end of the
UN Mission to Haiti in 1996, and the establishment of Palestinian interim self-government
in West Bank and Gaza under the Oslo Accords in 1995 also coincide with improvements in
democracy in both cases.
Total democracy and governance aid to these countries accounts for nearly 51% of all
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democracy and governance aid in our study. These cases illustrate a key problem with
many explanations of how aid influences democratic change: donor uncertainty and donor
incentives to successfully appear to send money to democracies. The previously outlined
explanations begin with the assumption that donors are able to identify key actors and
institutions that can be supported at key moments in order to support democratization.
Unlike the cases described above, where internal shifts and external influences can be easily
observed from outside the recipient state, the process of democratization is often more incre-
mental and driven by domestic forces that are difficult to observe. Likewise, identifying key
actors to empower may also be difficult. While donors may attempt to assist the process,
in most cases, identifying potential democratizers is more akin to reading tea leaves than
the systematic selection of recipients. Indeed, within our data, donors only pick democratic
“winners” about half of the time; and many of those cases are identifiable because of easily
observed characteristics favoring democratic improvements.
Donors’ difficulty in identifying ideal targets for democracy aid may help explain our
unexpected findings. The previously discussed cases include clearly identifiable movement
or changes that preceded changes in democracy and may have served a cues to donors to
increase aid. Such cues are not present in all cases. Without such signals, donors may
attempt to observe and interpret other signs of democratic promise—a difficult task with
greater levels of uncertainty. As a result, donors target many recipients with varying levels of
aid depending on what a donor observes about and within a potential recipient. Providing
low levels of aid to many countries that are slowly democratizing may provide a positive
correlation between aid and higher level measures of democracy, regardless of whether aid
is targeting a particularly promising recipient or contributing to the creation of democracy
domestically. This still leaves us with questions regarding if, and by what mechanisms, low
levels of technical aid are contributing to improvements in democracy if not through these
institutional mechanisms.
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Figure 1: USAID DG Aid After Positive Democracy Shifts
−0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
−8 −4 0 4
Time relative to Treatment
Co
ef
fic
ie
nt
Estimated Average Treatment Effect
As an alternative explanation for our data, if donors are attempting to pick future de-
mocratizers in the absence of clear cues such as the end of a civil war or the creation of an
independent states, they will likely be seeking recipients with demonstrable improvements in
democratic norms and institutions. Greater democratic changes within a potential recipient
are both more easily observed by donors and also induce greater confidence among donors
that the recipient will be a democratic “winner.” Thus, donors may give more aid to recipi-
ents with more observable changes in democratic norms and institutions. If this is the case,
aid may follow rather than lead democratic improvements.
We use generalized synthetic control methods (Xu 2017) to examine the plausibility
of this reverse causal process. Treating change in democracy as the treatment, we ask
if broad democratization leads aid. In particular, we test whether positive shifts in V-
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Dem’s polyarchy index predict governance aid investments by USAID.8 Figure 1 presents the
estimated average treatment effect (ATE) of positive polyarchy shifts on USAID’s democracy
and governance aid disbursements. The synthetic control method suggests a substantial
positive shift in aid to “treated” cases, relative to synthetic controls, although the noise
around the ATE is substantial. This result is nominally consistent with the idea that USAID
picks winners. Nonetheless, we do not wish to place too much significance on this result.
While we do not observe a similar estimated ATE in the other direction—positive aid shifts,
defined in a variety of ways—are not generally associated with democratization, according to
this method, our result is sensitive to specification. For example, if we define treatment as a
large positive shift in democracy (e.g., 0.2 on the polyarchy scale) we recover an ATE that is
indistinguishable from zero. The 1990–2003 panel upon which Finkel, Perez-Linan & Seligson
(2007) rely is short, and contains only a few cases that meet this more stringent standard.
This estimation strategy is also substantially more demanding of the data, and relies on less
stringent assumptions, than the Finkel, Perez-Linan & Seligson’s (2007) growth modeling
approach. Thus, while we are hesitant to claim that USAID is clearly picking winners,
our results—both the lack of support for the purported mechanism linking democracy aid
to democratization, and the synthetic control estimates of the ATE of democratization on
aid allocations—call seriously into the question the extent to which these data support the
contention that democracy and governance aid strengthens democratic institutions.
5 Conclusion
We find the results here tantalizing. How are improvements in democracy being created using
technical election aid if not by improving specific, identified capacities or improving aspects of
8We define treatment as non-negligible positive shift—a positive move of 0.05 or more—in the V-Dem
polyarchy measure. This definition is, admittedly, arbitrary, but is intended to capture any meaningful
positive shift.
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elections? Returning to our results (Models 1-11), we find only a single association between
typical micro-level targets of specific democracy and governance USAID projects and aid
levels, one that could also be explained by a different, non-agent empowerment, mechanism.
We can think of several possible explanations. The most obvious is that democracy and
governance aid does not, on average, improve democracy within countries. It does not
improve capacity, voter registration, or reduce a variety of misconduct in elections. In
fact, the only micro-level result we find, that democracy and governance aid is associated
with a reduction in government intimidation during elections, is more consistent with a
reputational explanation of aid’s democratizing effect than the importance of meaningful
technical improvements.
If this is the case, then what is the United States spending its democracy and governance
aid on? In Models 12-15, we find evidence that supports previous accounts of foreign aid,
that aid does covary with important higher order measures of democracy level. While we
cannot conclude with finality based on the data, we find some evidence that democracy and
governance aid flows into countries when the fundamentals of democracy improve, not vice
versa. Democracy and government aid chases democracy but does not create it, which ap-
pears as over-time covariance with aggregate democracy changes in models. Substantively,
one can interpret this pattern several ways. Cynically, bureaucrats at aid agencies seek out
democratizing countries to support with their foreign aid, attempting to find “winners” that
make their performance appear better and justifies their agency and its strategies. Alter-
natively, the same facts could suggest that agencies know, in practice, that despite their
stated goals of creating democracy, they instead do the most good by bolstering democra-
tizing countries that already show democratic progress. Either interpretation, however, does
suggest that democracy and governance aid does not induce democracy, a finding consistent
with the idea that modern authoritarians would choose not to accept aid that could endanger
their regimes.
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Alternatively, there could be more mundane reasons for our non-findings. We may not
have identified (or do not possess) the proper variables to measure the strength of the right
empowered agents. In particular, we have not measured the empowerment of civil society
or non-electoral agents. Extant theory does suggest that democracy could be strengthened
through the solidification of civil society using foreign aid monies. On the other hand, for
recipient governments to accept civil society aid bolstering domestic groups, it must surely
be apolitical aid. Similarly, it is possible that the particular agents we measured were not
empowered in the 1990-2003 panel of data tested, and so yield no results, while other agents
that were empowered in the data are not measured at the micro-level; the takeaway from our
paper would therefore be to examine a much longer timeframe in a similar fashion.9 We also
find this possibility slightly implausible given that, qualitatively, USAID identifies the con-
duct of clean elections as one of its primary goals and allocates technical projects accordingly.
Another possibility is that foreign aid democracy and governance programs generate demo-
cratic outcomes, but primarily do so through other mechanisms than the proposed agent
empowerment framework. Of course, then we might ask why so many individual projects
themselves are premised upon empowering various democratic institutions and agents within
domestic countries when we drill down to project descriptions and actual aid uses. What
is the purpose of an elaborate democracy and governance smokescreen if the real democra-
tizing impact of aid comes from traditional sources of power mostly related to international
political circumstances?
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